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I. Introduction
IIi Phase I of Mikhail Gorbachev's tenure as chief director of Soviet
economic strategy, the General Secretary seemed content to continue an
approach his predecessors had referred to as plan "perfecting" (sovershenstvovanie). This approach which called merely for the development
and implementation of modest improvements in the planning mechanism.
It was the chosen alternative to economic reform, the approach which had
been peremptorily rejected with the closing of the Kosygin reforms at the
end of the 1960s.
This plan-perfecting strategy had not Yielded any noteworthy improvements in economic performance for Gorbachev's predecessors, but when
combined with some Andropovian austerity, it had seemed to offer
promise. Moreover, plan polishing had been implemented with some apparent success in East Germany, and at that point was certainly more in
harmony with the party's philosophical position than a program of
economic reform. Some of the techniques that had seemed effective in
the GDR appeared to be of interest to Gorbachev, and a number of the
planning techniques and policy elements that became a part of Phase I's
early doctrine of "acceleration" (uskorenie) and, for that matter, even of
Phase IT's economic reconstruction (perestroika) seem strongly reminiscent of East German innovations and practices.t
As it became apparent that the initial strategy would not Yield an acceptable harvest of productivity growth, Gorbachev's rhetoric took on a
revolutionary tone? and he began to insist on the implementation of radical reform. He thus moved beyond the initial step of tinkering with
economic planning, and his economic probing was accompanied by cultural (glasnost) and political (demokratizatsiya) programs that have already guaranteed their author immortality.
By 1987 perestroika seemed well launched, but from that point the
Soviet Union entered a phase of ostensible consolidation with additional
change coming primarily in the political realm. To some degree, the com1

plexities of political change led to a deemphasis of economic processes.
Even worse, the individual Soviet republics watched the pleasing developments of 1989 in East Europe and began to vent increasingly open and
strong desires to obtain their own independence. The political turmoil
and the nationalities question helped usher in a period of economic stagnation.
Of course, economic miserywas not merely the result of neglect on the
part of the reformers. It is widely argued that Gorbachev's programs
broke down the institutions of balancing and of central supply provision,
but did not replace them with market relationships. It is true that market
relationships have not yet been established, but there is appeal in the
argument that the planning apparatus has not really been broken.. It still
functions to some extent, although the reform effort has tended to confuse
and complicate traditional production relationships. In any case, there
was little energy or political will in this period of political turmoil to introduce new and vital initiatives. And from the initial reform legislation and
organization, numerous measures had still not been incorporated or had
not really been implemented.
The strong, directed action needed in the Soviet Union can be thought
of as Phase ill of perestroika. This paper will address a number of the
essential measures still required to extract the Soviet economy from the
deep economic crisis it had entered by the early 1990s. Unfortunately, it
cannot be guaranteed that the necessarymeasures will be effected in time.
It can only be hoped that this is the Soviet Union's darkest hour, and that
a Phase III could bring new hope for perestroika.
The birth process of democracy in the Soviet Union may miscarry or
be aborted if perestroika should. fail. To this point, no substantial
economic progress can be demonstrated for Soviet economic reform, and
there seems to be rather distressing consensus both in and outside the
Soviet Union that none can be expected for some time? The thesis of this
paper is that perestroika will have to receive new impetus and directions;
the ongoing Soviet search for an economic plan to achieve marketization
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and privatization demonstrates that impetus and direction are still lacking.
Without them, the economic process cannot be expected to shift to a new
level, i.e., to enter the third phase of Gorbachev's economic leadership.
The next section (II) of the paper will review various core principles of
Soviet reform, focussing on some of the reasons, all too well known to the
expert, for the insufficiency of Perestroika's Phase Il, Section ill will
discuss two important variants of reform in pre-Gorbachevian East
Europe, viz., the early Polish and the New Economic Mechanism of the
Hungarian reform. These cases demonstrate, as would other examples,
the difficulty (one might argue the impossibility) of partial reform under
the constraints of traditional Marxist-Leninist socialism. Sections IV and
V will address the only previous successful attempt to dismantle a centrally planned system, viz., the West German postwar experience under Ludwig Erhard. Section IV will discuss differences in and section V will discuss similarities between the approach that was taken by the Federal
Republic of Germany in the early postwar period and that of the Soviet
Union today.

n,

The Insufficiencies Of Perestroika

The common central theme of East European economic reform is that
independence for the individual enterprise is vital. Such independence
represents the attempt, through the creation of the appropriate accounting
conditions and legal forms, to induce state-owned firms do to respond as
firms in a market environment.i If designers succeed in implementing
this procedure, producers will be motivated to pay more attention to consumer preferences, to the quality and assortments of their products, and to
using resources and innovations efficiently. Properly designed institutions
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would both enable and induce enterprise management to function in every
phase of their activity without ministerial "petty tutelage" (melochnaya
opeka).
The necessary legal condition for genuine self-management is met by
the provision in the Law on the State EnterpriseS granting that the institution "the right, at its own initiative to make all decisions...not at variance
with existing legislation." Anything not specifically forbidden is permissible! The sufficient condition is, of course, the actual enforcement of the
law that extends the desired independence to production units. It is interesting, if not ominous, that an earlier section of the law appears to
make enterprise independence, expressed by the power to plan its own
activities and enter into contracts, subject to numerous constraints. In this
process, the enterprise is "guided" in its independence "by control figures,
state orders, long-term scientifically substantiated economic normatives
and ceilings, as well as consumers' orders.,,6
.
One of the most basic challenges of perestroika is for the reformers to
design laws and institutions in such a way as to break the control of the
ministries and planning agencies over the activities and decision processes
of individual production units. The phenomenon of central intervention
was a natural part of the epoch attempt of Marxist-Leninist socialism to
remove "exploitative" pricing prerogatives from the firm, placing the pricing function and the responsibility to assure the production of goods corresponding to the economy's needs in the hands of planning and ministerial bodies. Gorbachev wants to restore to the enterprise the functions
both of production and price formation, but has not yet removed from the
central and ministerial agencies the responsibility to assure the availability
of outputs demanded. Hewett has made the point forcefully that this is a
potential cause of failure for the entire reform movement? If this responsibility is not removed from the ministries, they will quite naturally intervene in production activities with every available measure, and with the
required intensity and frequency to assure that their responsibilities are
met.
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In his advocacy of the socialist market, Aganbegyan8 retains the caveat
that prices for key products (such as fuel, electricity, the most important
raw materials, rolled steel machinery, and some consumer goods) will
continue to be set centrally, so as to equip the government with some
control over the rate of growth of prices. Nevertheless, price formation
will be considerably less centralized and commodity sales will be by contract and "with freely set prices."
These measures could normally be viewed simply as a policy prerogative a government would be expected to retain. But in the Soviet case,
when the planning apparatus holds open the option of price control to
stave off inflation or to achieve other planning objectives, we must expect
the worst. Since the reform effort cannot be expected to avoid powerful
inflationary pressures in the process of decontrol, to give the bureaucracy
advance party approval to intervene as inflationary dangers dictate is to
expand substantially the likelihood of reform sabotage.
The Law of the State Enterprise preserves an activist role for the
ministries, leaving them the right to issue norms and limits for the
enterprise, to confirm state orders, to coordinate basic planning data, and
to provide uniform technical policy. The ministry is authorized to give the
enterprise assistance in technology matters, inter-industrial relations, and
in foreign economic activities.9
A regulatory role to counter the "monopoly tendencies of individual
enterprises...to overcome the overstating of unit cost and prices, stagnation in the technical development and artificial restrictions on the production and marketing of output enjoying consumer demand,,1o is also established. Although such powers bode ill for economic devolution, opening
the door for extensive ministerial and agency intervention, the new legislation does make provision for enterprise appeal should the "higher-level
agency" issue an act or regulation in violation of "legislative requirements." An act can be declared fully or partially invalid by the state court
of arbitration if it violates the new legislation, entitling the enterprise to
compensation for losses inflicted by the process.!1
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What seems most inimical to the independence of production units is
the general attitude of planners and legislators toward the ministries.
When one considers the prescribed role of the ministries and planning
agencies, in spite of emphatic Gorbachevian strictures on "petty tutelage,"
there are numerous openings, even requirements, for central intervention
in enterprise activities. Where the slightest opportunity exists, ministries
quickly develop patterns of systematic intervention. The provisions of the
new law were too often expressed in insufficiently concrete terms. According to one Soviet observer, more than half of the new legislation
consists of "theoretical judgments, wishes, and indefinite prescriptions,"
and many of the norms that survived the passage of the reform laws
"preserve elements of the obsolete economic mechanism and block radical changes in it."u
The planners will continue to supply planning norms even after the
intended introduction of full khozraschet. They will thus continue to suggest or mandate capital charges, growth relationships between average
wages and labor productivity, levies on the wages fund, the use of hard and
foreign currency revenues from foreign markets, the uses of all enterprise
earnings (divided among investments, factor payments, social outlays for
worker benefits, etc.), the economizing of energy and materials in production, and much more. The ministries are to establish concrete normative
magnitudes tailor-made to individual enterprises in their jurisdiction, establishing a stable framework for five-year periods. 13 Given their hierarchical mentality, the enterprise interpretation of ministerial "suggestions"
will be that they are mandatory.14
A healthy menu of activities was also envisaged by the Law of the State
Enterprise for GOSPLAN, although the preference of the legislators was
clearly for perspective activities. The section of the legislation addressing
the future role of the national planning agencybegins with the observation
that the planned direction of the economy is the most important achievement and advantage of socialism, and the main instrument for the realization of the economic policy of the party. Planning energies, however,
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must be shifted from annual to five- and fifteen-year planning periods, i.e.,
to the solution of strategic questions.
GOSPLAN's functions include the planning and implementation of
activities affecting the economy's structure and proportions, the individual
regions and branches, the directions. of scientific-technical progress, and
so on. 15 Planning agents interpret these general tasks as requiring intervention where independent enterprise action cannot be relied upon to
achieve the party's social objectives.
The imperfection of centrally determined prices is responsible for
many of the basic difficulties of planning. Under the pricing regime of
central planning, scarce resources and commodities are not used economically by producers or consumers; arbitrarily low prices imply that a
productive factor or commodity is abundant and may be used (or even
squandered) in the place of one with an arbitrarily higher price. Nor can
the productive performance of an enterprise be evaluated so long as it
pays arbitrary prices for its inputs and receives an arbitrary price for its
final product.
Two primary difficulties plague Soviet-type pricing: Stalinistic attitudes
toward prices and Stalinistic central planning traditions. The prevailing
attitude in the USSR has always been adverse to market price formation,
and the conviction likewise prevails that low prices are "good" and high
prices "bad." Accordingly, institutions have been designed to facilitate
control of movements of prices. These institutions have made price adjustments difficult, unwieldy, and slow; they do not respond to changing
economic conditions, preferences, or profit possibilities. Now that the
desirability of greater flexibility has become more apparent, Soviet planning administration must live with the impossibility of keeping from 12 to
18 million prices responsive to changing economic conditions.
The Soviets expect this to change in the process of "radical and total
refonn,,,16 under which all types of prices will be properly adjusted to
reflect costs (i.e., will be revised) and the processes of price determination
will be decentralized (i.e., will be reformed). Of extreme significance is
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the general recognition by the reformers that perestroika cannot succeed
without price restructuring. 1?
.
18
The price reform was scheduled to be in place in 1989 or 1990.
It
had also been announced for the beginning of 1991 with the initiation of
the 13th five-year plan. 19 The intent was to democratize the process of
price formation, reducing reliance on centralized direction and broadening the domain of contractual and unrestricted prices.
But the section of the Law on the State Enterprise, "Basic Directions
and Restructuring of the System of Price Formation under the Conditions
of the New Economic Mechanism," failed to make a clear break with the
past. 20 It spoke of unjustified centralization in price formation and of the
need to incorporate "use characteristics,,,21 or demand considerations into
price formation. Unfortunately, the "old thinking" was also betrayed.
One suggested change, for example, was to overcome the tendency "to
raise prices through the economic competitiveness and competition of the
enterprises.,,22 When "reviewing the level of prices" is mentioned, one
senses the expectation that the pricing agency will always exist and always
be handling whole sets of prices that otherwise remain untouched and
unchanged for years on end. Even if such adjustments coincided with
market realities, any dynamics would render them obsolete very quickly,
long before the next central readjustment. 23
The new legislation also contains a stricture that price changes "may in
no manner cause a deterioration in the level of living of the workers; on
the contrary, for certain categories of workers they must lead to an enhancement of that level and to a complete realization of social justice. ,,24
Although price formation through enterprise self-management and contracting should reduce the role of toe central pricing apparatus, the new
legislation calls specifically for an increased role for state pricing policy
and its responsible executor, the State Committee for Prices (Goskomtsen). The widely heralded promise that contract pricing will become
increasingly important, offers little consolation, for the section of the Law
of the Enterprise granting (strictly proscribed) pricing prerogatives to the
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socialist firm retains very large caveats. Article 17.7 provides for the
guidance of enterprises by centrally established prices and by prices confirmed by ministries and departments. 25 Not surprisingly, price-formation
agencies will determine the procedure for establishing contract prices and
monitor their application.
•
An excellent opportunity to undertake a de facto decentralization in
pricing appeared in March, 1988, when the draft of a Law on Cooperatives
was published. This new legislation put cooperatives on the same legal
footing as state enterprises regarding self-management, self-finance, and
self-planning. It does not restrict the new cooperatives to any particular
activities, and they are not subject to central planning. Larger units may
enter directly into export arrangements, and are to have discretionary use
of foreign currency earnings.
Approximately fifty thousand cooperatives came into being in the first
year after passage of the law (by 1991 the number was four or five times
as great), but they have, unfortunately, already encountered substantial
opposition. Consider, for example, the hundreds of restaurants that were
established in that period. Some Soviets have been willing to pay considerably higher prices than those of the state enterprises, correctly anticipating that the quality of the food and the service would be superior in those
outlets. But many Soviet citizens have been firmly opposed to the
dramatically higher incomes this generates for the new suppliers.26
Soviet citizens are apparently not yet prepared to tolerate the kinds of
income differentials that will permit an unleashing of the productive activity the cooperatives were designed to evoke.
27
As a result, the Soviet Council of Ministers promptly decreed their
displeasure with the new producers. It was alleged that the cooperative
response to strong demands had not been to increase supply in the spirit
of service for the public, but simply to charge higher prices. The Council
deprecated the laxness of the government agencies which had permitted
this to occur, but promised that central agencies would henceforth be
prepared to intervene against such "abuses." An alternative policy more
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in harmony with the reform would be to facilitate the entrance of more
cooperative suppliers in these popular markets. Many producers would
likely be happy to share the spoils, and their entry into the market would
augment supplies and encourage falling prices.
The new cooperatives, especially the agricultural ones, are encountering another form of opposition more odious to Gorbachev. In spite of the
passage of the Leasing and Cooperative laws, these new arrangements are
not being established basically because they are encountering every possible bureaucratic obstacle. The would-be leasers say that the local organs
who direct the state and cooperative farms are not in agreement with the
program directed at the farmers and laborers. Many of them, Gorbachev
complains, would prefer to manage things according to the old methods,
and they hinder the implementation of economic accountability in agriculture. Gorbachev correctly believes that land must be given to individuals
to manage, "so that they are truly in charge of their own land, so they will
be properly motivated to increase agricultural production.,,28 But any
property arrangements short of private property, no matter how innovative, will not produce the desired effects in the Soviet Union. This is
because farmers realize that so long as the land is not their own and that
prevailing property rights remain the prerogative of the party, the rules
can be changed and the incentive characteristics asfired to by any property rights arrangement short of ownership are los1.2
The cooperative movement taught another important lesson. Soviet
citizens have been trained for nearly seventy years to believe that they had
an inalienable "right" to stable prices, learning very early that inflation is
a phenomenon that can occur only in capitalism. Their ongoing concern
about price stability is a great barrier to progress for perestroika, since
Soviet directors are convinced that they cannot afford to cease their heavy
subsidization of basic commodities and permit prices to rise. Moreover,
it has recently been revealed that the government's budget deficit is considerably larger than had been previously admitted. That deficit arose
from the extensive subsidies, large and often unwise government expendi-
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tures, and wage and bonus payments that supplied consumers with rubles
greatly in excess of the supply of goods being produced. Excess cash and
its concomitant inflationary pressure are much larger than had been
thought. Now shortages are so rampant through the economy that to
cease subsidization or to decontrol prices could mean a price explosion.
As a result of this fear, Abalkin confirmed early in 1989 that the price
reform, scheduled for implementation by 1990 would be postponed.3D
That was disappointing because it implied that, at least for the time being,
the reforms could not really be implemented. Without scarcity prices,
there cannot be real reform; without control over the price level, support
for the reforms cannot be sustained. Since about that time, Gorbachev
has seemed to be in a zero-win game.
A final problem from a sampling of the many available, is the widely
discussed "human factor." From the perspective of Gorbachev,31 this is
one of the main problems perestroika must address. The reformers observe that once people have been liberated from the constraining institutions that had undermined incentives in the central planning environment,
they must take initiative and attack their problems. Perestroika has given
managers and agents in the state economic organs the opportunity to act,
e.g., to form new cooperatives or pursue self-employment. Says Aganbegyan,32 they must end their dependence, cease simply to wait to see
what the center .will do and what the center will demand from them, and
exercise their rights. The power is "not simply given but must be taken."
Abalkin and Loginow share the view that considerable room for
productivity growth still exists, which inter alia indicates that the human
factor problem remains far from resolved. These "reserves" can be
tapped, according to this view, through. the reduction of absenteeism, the
achievement of order and discipline, improvement in the establishment of
norms, the application of progressive forms of scientific labor organization, and through the process of innovation. They estimate that through
the elimination of absenteeism alone, industry could achieve a labor
productivity growth of from 15 to 20 percent. Furthermore, large labor
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losses arise throu~ insufficient infrastructure and the poor quality of
products available. 3
But the human factor problem is much larger than these considerations imply, and it is also larger than economists originally supposed.
When perestroika was yet in its infancy, economists were inclined to the
belief that socialist training in shirking and the party's alienation of the
working class could be overcome simply by getting the incentives right. It
is no less true today that incentive incompatibilities must be removed
from Soviet economic institutions, but today economists are probably less
sanguine about how readily seventy years of dependence training, worker
hostility, and cynicism can be overcome. Similar observations are appropriate for managerial personnel. Entrepreneurial spirit must be permitted to exist, but a more favorable environment will not immediately
compensate for the system's near-century long failure to develop a personality willing to take innovative initiative, to bear risk, and so on.
All these considerations seem to indicate that the reforms did not go
far enough.34 Not only has the reform legislation been of a lesser order of
magnitude than will prove necessary; as political initiatives became the
chief focus of the reform and the inviability of the Soviet Union became
more apparent, economic progress bogged down. We are left to hope not
only that the interested opposition will be unable to block reform implementation, but also that new initiatives will cause perestroika to become reanimated. Originally, Gorbachev appeared willing to extend the
reform effort as far as necessary. Certainly his rhetorical support of
perestroika was impressive, and the energy and vision of the reformers
surpassed anything we had previously experienced from the Soviet Union.
But over time Gorbachev has begun to reveal the limits of his flexibility.
He changed many early positions (moving from phase I to phase IT) as the
need arose, but he appears unable to overcome his fear of (or to forge a
consensus for) price increases, genuine private property arrangements,
and the establishment of a more viable economic community of inde-
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pendent states from the Republics which now comprise the Soviet Union,
and so on.
A particular difficulty for perestroika has been the huge Soviet budget
deficits, which by the beginning of the 1990s had gotten out of hand. When
the seriousness of the attendant inflationary pressure became apparent,
Gorbachev recognized that marketization under such conditions could
only set off a price explosion. In his first speech before the new Soviet
parliament he attacked the idea of a complete adoption of market
mechanisms to overcome the accumulation of difficulties, and expressed
the belief that this would immediately undermine the whole social situation and destroy "all processes in the country.,,35 But in the same speech
the new Soviet President indicated that a "decisive direction" of the
reforms would have to be the development of a "pulsating socialist
market. ,,36
The problem is, as always, one of getting from here to there. At the
end of 1990, the whole union was agonizing over what might be an effective plan for the establishment of a market system. Gorbachev faced two
alternative proposals: the bold, if not highly original Shatalin-Yevlinskii
plan supported by Boris Yeltsin, and the cautious Abalkin plan.38 The
Shatalin approach strongly influenced by the Balcerowicz plan implemented in Poland,38 would have taken the plunge to achieve the desired
objective in 500 days. The Polish "model" represents an extremely important economic experiment, since it holds out the possibility of making that
country only the second one ever to overcome a central-planning history.
The Polish attempt to achieve marketization was modelled after the
"economic miracle" constructed by Ludwig Erhard, whose quick and
thorough elimination of central controls in postwar West Germany will be
discussed with more detail below. Balcerowicz carefully studied the West
German economic recovery before receiving the opportunity to implement his "shock therapy" -in Poland. The Soviets have watched Poland's
attempt to transform its economic system with interest, and Shatalin was
certainly convinced that this was an effective path to take. After all, in but

13

a few weeks the Polish had watched a runaway inflation disappear in short
order. The ubiquitous socialist queuing also vanished, since almost overnight the normally empty shops were replete with goods. Gorbachev,
however, who by the 1990s enjoyed precious little popular support within
the Soviet Union, recognized that the public must have considerable confidence in its government to endure the sacrifices to which the Polish
people have been willing to submit themselves under the Balcerowicz
plan. 39 He remained opposed to anything that might disrupt the already
tense social situation in the country.
Neither of the two alternative Soviet marketization plans was welldeveloped conceptually; Gorbachev was inclined to support the more
gradualist approach, but he commissioned Yeremenko and Aganbegyan to
work out a compromise, which within weeks seemed about as forgotten as
the "defeated" Shatalin plan. Nevertheless, the next step came soon
thereafter and showed considerable courage; it was the currency reform of
the last week of January, 1991, and will require our attention again below.
Legislation pertaining to economic reform continues to be prepared and
produced in Moscow. Unfortunately, it remains true in the Soviet Union
that legislation is only significant when it is enforced. Traditionally, the
party has had to stand behind any laws that were to have teeth, and if the
party ignored laws, it was as though they simply did not exist. Moreover,
the law might permit enterprise freedom of action, for example, and the
enterprise might even have cash to launch some productive venture. But
if the enterprise could in fact find no productive inputs, no available capital equipment, and no contract partners, the law could not contribute
substantially to the achievement of economic decentralization in the intended manner.
In spite of the delays, apparent indecisiveness and lack of progress
since perestroika's advent in the mid-1980s, Gorbachev and his supporters
remained convinced that the only hope for the development of the
economy was the consistent pursuit of economic reform. The General
Secretary admitted that the reform is very complicated, and that its sue-
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cessful implementation will require some complexly interrelated steps
directed to change "the methods of planning, of financial levers, of prices,
of taxes, wages, and all of the other parts of the economic mechanism."
Much still had to be accomplished before the inauguration of the 13th
Five-Year-Plan, and the reform would simply not be possible ''without a
radical renewal of socialist property relations." The only condition that
must remain on these relations, Gorbachev asserted, was "that the exploitation and alienation of the workers from the means of production
must not be permitted.,,40

III. Combining Market And Plan

Since 1987 it has become increasingly apparent, as has been demonstrated
above, that perestroika is scarcely as radical as its promoters' rhetoric.
Both the legislation, taken rather faithfully from Gorbachev's widely
publicized conceptions, and the implementation of reform measures leave
a substantial cleft between the basic values pursued (e.g., financial independence and accountability of enterprises, more viable prices, worker
participation in management, etc.) and the actual achievements. Perhaps
the Soviet Union's performance can be thought of as the intermediate
case between Phase I's evolutionary approach (planning amelioration) and
the truly radical case of decontrol, decentralization, and marketization of
Phase ITI. The actual goal of Soviet planning, whether or not that is apparent from the outcomes thus far achieved or from the guiding legislation
discussed above, is to achieve a socialist market. This market's functioning will differ, at first, in certain critical respects from that of a contemporary, market-based economy, but will over time likely move more
toward the Western model as it becomes apparent that many of the in-
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stitutions common to "capitalism" have developed historically for purposes other than just the exploitation of the workers. Initially, at least, the
socialist market of Gorbachev's conception would function with the guiding assistance of a sort of indicative plan.
Bogomolov has expressed the conviction of the Gorbachev reformists
that the use of "commodity-monetary instruments" (read "market transactions") together with the norms and rules established by the state, cause
planning to become more, rather than less, effective.41 It will be necessary for the Soviets, according to this view, to replace the mandatory state
plan with a guiding plan that will provide neither commands nor targets to
the enterprise, but only reference points. Bogomolov felt that such a
system had "proven itself in Hungary and China.,,42 Since such planning
can unleash the initiative and creativity of agents and institutions, it can
guide and strengthen the processes of economic development.
Before the peaceful revolutions of 1989, the most popular East
European model for Western economists was the Hungarian case, since
that country tried early and long to dismantle central planning institutions.
The thesis of this paper is that in the Brezhnevian environment that approach was a rather unmitigated failure. It provided evidence that a marriage between central planning and market mechanisms cannot guarantee
successful economic reform. If Hungary's march into the 1990s is to witness a new thrust for systemic reform that can ultimately succeed, then
that is because the intermediate reform model embodied in the 1968
"New Economic Mechanism" and currently being attempted by the Soviet
Union, is being cast off by the Hungarians and other East Europeans as
they move toward radical decontrol, decentralization, and a genuine transformation of their systems.43
It is the objective of this section to consider some of the reasons why
the intermediate approach to decontrol (as embodied in the reforms of
the 1960s) has to this point never succeeded in eliminating the inefficiencies and irrationalities of central planning. A brief review of a few of the
attempts to join planning with market elements to attain a "third way"
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between socialism and capitalism is therefore recommended. No attempt
will be made to consider the Chinese case in detail, since that could
stretch the credibility of the paper. 44 It would seem foolhardy to claim,
however, that China has already successfully overcome the post-1948 planning tradition, despite the introduction of reform measures, special free
economic zones, and some other interesting experiments.
Current developments in China and Hungary suggest that central planning has not proven to be a suitable partner for market institutions. Nor
did it fare well in labor-managed Yugoslavia. It may still be too early to
argue, of course, that successful devolution is best pursued by a direct leap
from Stalinist centralism to market mechanisms. The path between those
two conditions may optimally take twenty years, and as long as one
remains on that path the economy will function (to be euphemistic) suboptimally and struggle through hazardous times. If the economy is ever to
function well again, it will only be after the goal of sufficient decentralization 45 has been achieved. The present author has begun strongly to doubt,
however, that the gradualist approach can develop sufficient momentum
to break the human and institutional obstructions to either the process or
the outcomes of marketization. But let us consider here some evidence
for the more modest proposition that the addition of market elements to
a central planning system cannot result in successful reform.
The 19S0s Polish Case

Poland, being not only a nation of creative and liberty-loving people, but
also enjoying a large endowment of excellent economists, have been interested in economic reform since before the death of Stalin. A brief look at
the Polish case in the 1950s is instructive if for no other reason than that
what we read about it sounds so much like what we have continued to read
about reform experiments since.46
In discussions about reform during that period, criticism of the prevailing system of planning and management (so well known to the student of
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virtually any East European economy), as well as the arbitrariness and
excessive centralization of economic decision-making, were made forcefully by both theorists and practitioners. Proposals almost universally
called for economic decentralization, by which was meant the extension of
enterprise autonomy and greater scope for market forces,47 which is also
an effective and succinct way to describe perestroika. On April 9, 1956, a
joint resolution of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers'
Party and the Council of Ministers extended the powers of directors of
industrial enterprises. In many factories newly-organized workers' councils sought expanded rights.
The Polish economist Michael Kalecki, was convinced that a synthesis
of workers' councils and central planning was desirable. Yet Kalecki
warned against the illusion that such a system would be durable, free of
contradictions, or easy to manage. By the end of 1957 there were 5,600
workers' councils to take up some longer-term issues (such as the introduction of new ways of organizing production, introducing departmental
accounting systems, etc.), and also to address more practical matters (such
as combating absenteeism and the decline in work discipline). But the
basic problems with the Polish economy lay elsewhere. First, the councils
had to operate without vitally needed reforms in the system of economic
management. Also there was no radical reform of prices which would
enable autonomous enterprises to perform according to more rational
economic calculations. The system of planning failed to adopt wider use
of parametric (price-type) indicators in place of administrative directives.
Enterprises continued to be subordinated to central boards, subsequently
industrial associations, and economic ministries, so there was little room
for enterprise autonomy. As Oskar Lange had warned earlier, the
workers' councils were in fact powerless.48
The incredulous Poles had then to discover what has, in Gorbachev's
day, become the conventional wisdom. Poor performance was not so
much the result of the way enterprises were managed; rather, it was a
product of extreme bureaucratization and centralization. Once created,
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the apparatus tended to expand spontaneously. Many reformists of that
time thought they were observing errors in economic policy, not the characteristics of the economic organization. Kalecki started to perceive the
error only in the 1960s.49
The basic thrusts of the reform (the attempt to achieve enterprise
interdependence and democratization of the economy through the broad
participation of workers, workers' councils, and local authorities) both
failed. In practice enterprises enjoyed little autonomy and were neither
able nor willing to operate according to the principles of rational
economic calculation. Restrictions on the activities of workers' councils
likewise weakened the reform. Ultimately, and central planning was
preserved. It would take another three and a half decades for Poland to
begin to experience positive economic change of any real significance.
Yet, as discussed earlier, it was not the result of economic reform, but of
economic transformation a la Balcerowicz.

The Hungarian New Economic Mechanism

After some tentative reform measures beginning in 1956-57, Hungary's
more serious New Economic Mechanism (NEM) was introduced in 1968
to replace plan directives with market relations among firms. It was intended that the scope of central price determination be limited, and that
the domestic prices of exports and imports be linked to world market
prices. Investment decisions were, in large part, to be decentralized.Y As
a result of the external shocks of the 1970s and the declining terms of
trade confronting Hungary after 1973, the center made reduced use of
NEM's market mechanisms.
After steps had been taken to recentralize the economy between 1972
and 1976, reform measures were again introduced in 1980 and 1981. The
intent was to reestablish momentum for the New Economic Mechanism.
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After Gorbachev came to power and the Hungarians became convinced
that Hungary had a free hand in the direction of its economy, far more
sweeping measures in both the economic and political realms were introduced. But the objective here is not to consider the Hungarian reform
process after the removal of the constraints of the Brezhnev era. Of interest is the NEM approach, which provides supportive evidence for the
proposition that combining market mechanisms with substantial central
planning residuals cannot secure the efficiency and incentive properties of
market-oriented systems.
To begin with, we may observe that the NEM did not fully address the
"human factor" problem of socialism. Not until 1985 did new regulation
introduce the possibility for firm employees, directly or indirectly, to elect
top managers in state-owned firms. Administrative and political authority
retained substantial influence regardin§ the pre-selection of the candidates and veto powers for the election. 1 The democratization process,
which can be seen as part of the effort to regain the commitment of
workers and thereby to increase labor productivity, was not possible
before Gorbachev but moved forward rapidly thereafter.
NEM notwithstanding, one of the key problems of Hungarian (as well
as of other variants of) central planning, remains the "soft budget constraint.,,52 Through all the years of the Hungarian intermediate reform,
granting or denying credit was hardly correlated with the profitability or
credit worthiness of an enterprise. The credit system continued too frequently to prevent firms from failing. Actually, none of the measures
attempted in the NEM, including those taken after 1979 in the second
round of reform, achieved real success, although Belassa considered some
of the later measures "important steps" towards improved efficiency. He
predicted further steps would be necessary, perhaps over a period of time,
in order to minimize the economic disruptions that necessarily follow
abrupt changes.,,53 By mid 1985, he felt the pricing improvements, the
"linchpin" of the 1980-1981 reforms, would have to continue, although a
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good start had been made by introducing "competitive" prices in
numerous industries.54
The second reform round also attempted to address the problem of
investment. In accord with the attempt to overcome the "soft budget
constraint," the state was determined to provide investment funds only
when the profitability of the enterprise was disadvantaged by centrally-imposed deviations from world-market prices and when the choice among
investment applicants would be made on the basis of "profitability at undistorted prices." It would take the form of a credit to be repaid in 10
years.55
An important innovation was the legalization of part of the Hungarian
second economy, which Kornai defines as the sum of formal and informal
private sector activity.56 The Hungarian "good life" was achieved not
because economic performance improved, but basically because so many
people were working devastatingly long days at two jobs. According to
Komai, many were working themselves to the point of "psychological and
physical exhaustion,,,57 which represented a poorly disguised cost of
socialism.
All in all, right up to 1989 there remained a distressingly broad scope
for bureaucratic intervention into the Hungarian economy. Kornai expressed a sentiment that is most likely shared by most observers of planning systems attempting to utilize markets, l.e., that there are certain critical values which pertain to the frequency and intensity of bureaucratic
intervention into market processes which cannot be ignored without consequence. Once these critical values are exceeded the market is "emasculated and dominated by bureaucratic regulation.,,;8 When this happens,
as it did in the Hungarian state-owned sector, the market will continue to
have some coordinating effect, but that effect will be weak. Worse yet,
this development not only prohibits the harmonious coexistence of plan
and market, or the functioning of a "regulated market," but assures the
continuation of dual dependence for the firm, or put another way, the
domination of the bureaucracy.
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Before the recent period, in which the attempt has been made to extract completely the planning processes from the economy, Komai expressed his uncertainty as to whether contemporary Hungary had basically
reached the ultimate limits of reform,59 and could counsel only waiting
and watching. Since Gorbachev made irrevocable his cancellation of the
Brezhnev doctrine and the liberation of East Europe, Hungary and the
other relevant economies have rather uniformly demonstrated their conviction that trying to reform a central planning system is pointless. It must
be replaced by a market system in its totality.

IV. The West German Case:
Similarities With the Soviet Union
Consider now the single, historically-completed case of successful retreat
from central planning: that of the Federal Republic of Germany. There
are, of course, differences between nascent West Germany and the central
planning systems of pre-1989 East and Central Europe. But what experts
heretofore have failed to observe are the number of significant and striking similarities.60 In order to establish this point, let us address first these
similarities.
Early in the postwar period, a classic paper by Walter Eucken61
detailed for an English-speaking audience how closely the Nazi German
economy corresponded to the genre of the centrally administered economy
(Zentralverwahungswinschaft), Investigation of centrally managed
economies causes one to marvel at the universality and persistence of the
phenomena of irrationality and inefficiency resulting from the subservience of economics to politics in social systems that exercise power in the
interests of its holders. Nazi Germany's central planning system began to
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emerge as the result of the rigorous implementation of full employment
policies, and later from the militarization of society. But Germany
pioneered techniques that have become common to .central planning, and
the economic phenomena experienced in wartime and postwar Germany
were remarkably like those found in the Soviet Union, China, and East
Europe.
Pricing problems

No one has yet discovered how a national economy can be made to function effectively in the absence of a market pricing system. During those
relatively brief historical periods in which it has appeared to be possible to
do so, later revelations of real economic conditions have disabused us of
thiis illusion. Centrally-set prices result in distortions and inflexibility that
preclude competitive performance, especially in the international
economic realm. Yet centrally-set prices are a must, as Eucken pointed
out, for the central planning administration, which cannot leave the
development of the economy's structural direction to market pricing
processes. It must, instead, "reserve the direction for itself, which was
what happened in Germany.,,62 In the light of planning experience from
Eucken's day to the present, his insistence that one cannot have both
centralized price management and decentralized decision making63 seems
less an ideological statement, and more an expression of simple economic
fact.
The Soviet Union's current inability to decontrol prices stems from the
presence of ubiquitous shortages and the fear of intolerable inflation.
Precisely those concerns argued against decontrol in Eucken's day.64
Naturally, those fears are not without substance, but there is an answer to
the problem: it is the currency reform that represents an important part
of perestroika's Phase ill. Currency reform was widely discussed in the
Soviet Union, but was rejected, probably because of the fear that the
introduction of new currency would cause the independence-minded
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republics to counter by introducing their own currencies. The solution
was perceived by perestroika's designers to be the (partial?) currency
reform of January 1991.
The reform left the three, five, and ten ruble notes as valid currency,
but replaced the old 50 and 100 ruble notes with new ones. Currency
holders could trade old for new notes to an amount not exceeding 1,000
rubles. This arbitrarily removed from circulation large amounts of domestic currency with tremendous inflationary potential, and also eliminated
ruble holdings outside the USSR. One immediate effect was to enrage
citizens of limited means - who lost a large share of their savings, most
of which had been accumulated because of the unavailability of purchasable goods in retail outlets. This move required courage from Gorbachev. Now, it remains to be seen whether a sufficient amount of excess
purchasing power will be eliminated so as to make price decontrol possible.
The same solution was unavoidable in Erhard's launching of the West
German "economic reform." The currency reform of 1948 was essential
to eliminate the vast excess supply of money, defusing the potentially explosive inflationary forces in the economy. It was essential to permit the
establishment of scarcity or efficiency prices, and to open the way for the
convertibility of the currency so that the economy could claim the benefits
of rather unconstrained international activity. All of these effects and
their benefits must be achieved if perestroika is ultimately to succeed, and
it will take courage to stick with the policies of decentralization, as the
German case demonstrated.65
The imposition of a currency reform is accompanied by much social
trauma. It is chemotherapy for a macro economy basically in a state of
morbidity. Individuals are willing to tolerate the elimination of much of
their money stocks only if they are convinced that such action is necessary
to avert economic calamity. It is still too early to tell whether the Soviet
currency reform of 1991 represents a first element of Phase III for
perestroika.
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Industrial Concentration
References to economies of scale and other benefits are often made to
justify industrial concentration, a rather general characteristic of central
planning regimes. Today, just as in the time of Eucken, it is "simpler for
the central authorities to negotiate with a few large units than with many
small ones. ,,66 I have heard almost the exact words from socialist
economists referring to the centrally-planned economy.
In the case of Nazi Germany, the effects of industrial concentration
proved very durable. Efforts were made in the postwar period to reduce
accumulations of economic power; these were not totally successful and
many were later rolled back. An attempt was also made to show that
private power centers (banks, industrial associations, corporate supervisory boards, etc.) in the postwar, liberal economy became the practical
substitute for centralized planning.67 The problem did not prove insuperable for the Federal Republic; extensive participation in international
markets helped to compensate for the insufficient competitive forces of
the domestic economy, and this was combined fortuitously with the
provision of social policy benefits to the appropriate social strata and codetermination (Mitbestimmung) for labor. For the Soviet Union, however,
it is not clear what techniques of policy might most effectively curb the
potential abuses of decentralized, but very concentrated industries.

The Objective of Constructing a Social Economy
Both of the decentralizing economies under investigation had important
social objectives. Erhard hoped to gain social acquiescence for the
demanding tasks of reconstruction by dedicating the "economic miracle"
to liberality of social policy, although the central thrust was admittedly
toward the creation of a larger social pie rather than a continual redivision
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of the dimensions of the slices accruing to social groups. Nevertheless, as
Loesch has pointed out, Erhard transformed an administrative economy
into a social market economy.68
A most significant difficulty for the Soviet Union in Phase III will
doubtless be that the more apparent the departure from central planning
becomes, the more difficult it will be to claim that the Soviet Union
remains, in any sense, a socialist country. Had Erhard been willing to
make the claim that he was determined to use the market mechanism, but
only to construct a socialist economy with room for worker co-determination, large production units, and a plethora of social programs, we might
have a different perception of the Federal Republic today. If Gorbachev
retains as much emphasis on social welfare as the Federal Republic, that
might satisfy the ideological demands of socialist reconstruction.

Shortage
Shortages and queues are the substance of daily reports from the Soviet
Union. Postan reminds us that in postwar Germany a shortage of goods
had been accumulating for years. To some extent, of course, this was the
result of war destruction and the large and urgent need for reconstruction,
but shortages were also a result of the planning system. Moreover, the
shortages were combined with a plethora of money. Everyone had more
than could be spent on rationed commodities and used for rent and fuel.
Why, then, should one incur the personal costs of labor when the income
earned could not be exchanged for food, household goods, or anything
else desirable. So people avoided work and exchange, hoarding their
labor power and their personal or small business inventories of commodities and supplies. Shortages were combined, in other words, .with
immense reserves of unemployed resources.69
In spite of the general shortages of the postwar German economy, the
currency reform was possible because inventories were available. Once
the populace had received a small number of Deutsche Mark70 and addi-
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tional funds could only be earned through sales, the shops in Germany
were suddenly full. People had simply been unwilling to supply commodities for money with meager purchasing power. In the Soviet Union
there are less abundant inventories available, but there are nevertheless
consumer hoards of many items, and enterprise hoards of inputs that are
sometimes substantially larger than counterpart capitalist firms' inventories. There are also abundant reserves of hitherto untapped labor
power that can be used very quickly to expand production in Phases III of
perestroika.
Worker Self-Management and Self-Determination

System managers under both Erhard and Gorbachev received a mandate
to pursue labor tranquility and participation by offering workers a share in
the production unit's decision-making processes. Postwar Germany was
unique among Western countries in attempting to enhance the role of
labor in the government of both national and private industry. The industrial code of 1946 stipulated that boards of directors (Aufsichtsrathe)
were to contain workers' representatives. This first installment of German industrial democracy fell far short of its earlier promise, failing to
raise greatly the workers' share in the direction of factories or shops.?1
Nevertheless, codetermination ultimately did contribute to worker satisfaction, and it remains on the Federal Republic's list of positive accomplishments of the economic miracle. It is still too early to say whether
the approach of ,gerestroika, i.e., the election of enterprise managers by
labor collectives is of as little worth in the promotion of the reform
effort as casual evidence thus far seems to indicate. It is likely that as the
conditions for labor self-management become more favorable, the new
institutions may yet prove effective.
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The Difficulties of Dismantling Central Control

From the point when a centrally planned economy (CPE) makes the
decision to readopt the market mechanism to the point where the
economy has actually acquired a set of market prices and achieved currency convertibility, an extended and rather rigorous transition period must
be traversed. In the case of the Federal Republic the period lasted ten
years. Decentralization and decontrol have been a rather wrenching experience in the Soviet Union. The reluctance of the leadership of the
Soviet Union to move quickly and resolutely toward far-reaching
decentralization is reminiscent of the occupying Allied Forces in Germany
in 1945 who felt they had no choice but to continue the administration of
Hitler's war economy largely as it had been. Stolper et. ale felt that had
they tried to abolish the system "at one stroke, the chaos would have been
even worse.,,73 In the three subsequent years attempts to cope with ubiquitous shortages by strict official regulation proved increasingly hopeless.74
The administrative director of the United Economic Region at the
time was Ludwig Erhard, who proposed that only the most critically
needed raw materials and foodstuffs (e.g., bread, milk, fats, cereals, coal
electric power, iron, and steel) continue to be rationed at fixed prices.?5
Production then proceeded to increase at a speed which no one had
foreseen. In the last six months of 1948 industrial production increased
by an incredible 50 percent; the following year it did so again by well over
25 percent.
Wallich likewise gives the Federal Republic credit for overcoming a
"substantial amount of government intervention" that remained in the
economy at the time Erhard began to function as Economic Minister.76
Naturally, as in any economic situation, many circumstances and events
could not be controlled by the West German policy managers. To some
extent, they were the benefactors of good fortune. They were favored by
Marshall Plan assistance, enjoyed a commercial boom generated by the
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Korean War, and profited from the powerful economic stimulus of the
European Economic Community; all of which contributed to the
Wirtschaftswunder. Still, good economic management was also important.
The ingrained German dread of inflation motivated strict anti-inflationary
policies, and a sound currency permitted the rapid dismantling of price
ceilings, rationing, and materials controls. However, even with all these
factors, experts do not doubt that decentralization was the key to Erhard's
success.
West German decontrol went further and faster than most people
would have believed feasible, but the Soviets can take heart in the important fact that successful decontrol need be neither perfect nor complete.
In the German case, it was certainly not complete. Basic foods and industrial materials such as coal and steel remained under control for a long
time after the currency reform and the decontrol of the lion's share of
industrial consumer goods'?? German agriculture was given strong
protection, and was also shielded against domestic price fluctuations. Although on balance freedom was the dominant characteristic, the policy
combined freedom with controls.
The Second Economy
The combination of excess cash, hoards of commodities, excess government regulation and taxation (in whatever form), will just about guarantee
the presence of an "underground," "shadow," or "second economy." Indeed, in the pre-Gorbachevian (Brezhnevian) world the only interesting
thing about Soviet economics was that which was illegal, ignored, or unwillingly tolerated.78
The same distorting influences that cause Soviet "corruption" and
black marketeering to assume such large proportions were also at work in
the German case. In the course of that country's central planning experience, even the most loyal and patient manager discovered that
production could not be maintained simply by relying on the ration office.
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Many essential inputs were obtainable by official permit only after agonizing delays, but they could be procured much more quickly on the black
market or through barter arrangements. Naturally, personal contacts, the
second economy, and bartering assumed ever greater importance. In an
officially managed economy, these developments meant a drain on existing resources and a decline in the volume of official production. The
second economy of Soviet socialism, which works essentially the same way
as it had done in Germany, became so powerful under Brezhnev that it
helped undermine the formal Soviet system. Wallich also sees the second
economy as "the ultimate bankruptcy" of the command economy.?9

v.

The West German Case: Differences

Although many of the differences between the economic situation prevailing in the Soviet Union today and those pertaining to Germany in the
19405 are not really substantive, a number certainly are. Such differences
'generally represent problems for the Soviet Union that were not as confining or severe in the German experience, and solutions will require
patience and creative policies on the part of the Soviet Union. Overcoming some of those differences will, in fact, require some substantive additional changes in the restructuring endeavors of the Soviet leadership. A
combination of currency reform, freeing prices, pursuing currency convertibility, and other such measures will be perestroika's Phase III. One
could only wish that these measures were assured and that they could
guarantee the success of Soviet restructuring. But let us here consider
some of the significant differences between West German decentralization and the Soviet case.
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Property Ownership and Omnipresent Government
For many socialists, the central characteristic of socialist economics is the
public ownership of the means of production. Although Gorbachev has
demonstrated a willingness to engage in some experimentation, traditional
socialist property relations have hardly been discarded. In contrast to the
Soviet case, German central planning was not based on public ownership.
Eucken argued that property relations are not really the significant issue
in central planning. The combination of central administration and direction with collective property ownership is not necessary. In Germany the
means of production on farms and in factories had remained
predominantly in private ownership, but the owners could only dispose of
their property to a limited extent. According to Eucken, there was
"widespread requisitioning of industrial stocks~which were released only
for the particular purposes of the central plan." To the extent that public
ownership stands in the way of effective incentive arrangements, it should
be subject to appropriate alteration. The Soviet Union has already begun
to address this problem in Phase II and it is probably not the strongest
constraining factor.
The more difficult reform obstacle is that of the omnipresent government, which was as much a part of the German central-planning landscape
as it has been for the Soviets. Stolper et. al. express the situation prevailing after the defeat of national socialism very well; they describe it as an
economic ststem in which the government was "omnipresent and
paramount." 1 Even today, many socialists feel that public ownership
makes enterprise more willing to countenance change directed by the
political authorities. In highly centralized systems managers quickly learn
that their rewards are achieved (and sanctions avoided) when they accede
to the directives of the center. Ownership in that situation is not the
central consideration.
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The Approach to Reform
Once it became apparent that the Federal Republic would be endowed
with the privilege of independent action, the German reform was
launched without delay. Some time had already passed, however, and
significant consensus had been achieved that change was inescapable.
The decentralization was initiated with the currency reform in 1948 and
was essentially comfleted "with the achievement of full convertibility of
the DM in 1958.,,8 Erhard had a clear conception of what success required: a functioning price system and effective competition. Price
stability and convertibility were seen as guarantors of success, and private
ownership, freedom of commercial activity, and the freedom of agents to
form coalitions were also seen as important.,,83 In the view of Loesch,
Erhard's "clear theory" about the structure and functioning of the new
system made it possible for him to establish priorities and achieve an
effective sequencing of necessary reform measures. 84
It is clear that in Soviet perestroika some of the key elements of
reform are still lacking, especially price reform. Nor can it be argued that
the Soviets have based their approach to economic change on a welldeveloped methodology; they concede that they are groping their way.8S
Phase HI will require clearer articulation of objectives and the creation of
positive expectations among the populace in order to pave the way for
greater acceptance of the important elements of reform that are still lacking and will need to be painfully implemented.
Investment Under Competent Bankers and Managers
An important difference in the German and Soviet reform experience is
that the former country was much more generously endowed with
managers and bankers who understood how best to manage capital. Even
where individual entrepreneurs were too timid to commit needed capital
to industrial investment, banks became involved with financing and even
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with the management of industry. To protect their interests they often
participated in the selection of the directors and managers of firms, and
were not disinclined to impose their own representatives upon large and
cartelized firms. Some German economists have described this synergistic relationship as 'finance capitalism,.86 If the Soviets are to succeed in
Phase Ill, the search for more effective management (weaned from the
ministerial system and able to carry out its own investment program) must
be intensified from Phase II.
The "Human Factor"
There are some striking differences in the attitudes of workers, managers,
government officials, and other economic agents when one compares the
reform environments of postwar Germany and the contemporary Soviet
Union. One of Gorbachev's greatest problems is what he terms the
"human factor," which refers to the apathy, incredulity, mistrust, and hostility of the workers toward the party and the official economy. The Germans, too, were disillusioned with politics after the calamitous experience
with Nazism, but they were prepared for a flight from politics into production and reconstruction. By 1948, they wanted only to cast off every sort
of state regulation and to be free to exert their energies in a more liberal
economic order.
The crushing defeat of the war had left no illusion that the peace and
reconstruction would be pleasant. In Wallich's opinion, a highly equitable
income distribution might have "overburdened the strong" causing all "to
have sunk together." By being allowed to ameliorate their own position
first, economically viable agents were put in a position to "pull the rest
after them" in the general expansion of the economy. Gradually, wages
and pensions followed profits, with the lag permitting the investments
which accelerated reconstruction. 87 As a result, quickly after the dismantling of the centrally administered economy, Stolper observes, "expan-
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sionist forces were set free such as even the strongest believers in a free
market economy had .hardly anticipated.88
The modesty of German consumers and workers in that era made it
unnecessary to translate immediate economic gains into consumer improvements, and this was not done. Moreover, the threat of unemployment, which contemporary Soviets fear and abhor, deterred anti-social
behavior by the poorly motivated, if there were such in Germany's
reconstruction era. It was not socially hazardous that the system
produced inequalities of income, partly at the expense of labor, pensioners, refugees, and the unemployed. Wallich has interpreted the concentration of income as the price of high saving and high investment.89
The impressions ofjournalists and travelers about current conditions
in the Soviet Union would not give rise to the expectation that past Soviet
docility can be expected to continue indefinitely. The people of the Soviet
Union have been forced over the decades to cope with the conditions of
relative shortage, and their protest of apathy and poor workmanship gives
rise to phenomena which did not confront Erhard. The continuation and
worsening of the shortages is ubiquitously assumed to be hazardous for
Gorbachev's leadership. It is a common concern that Soviet citizens are
reaching the end of their patience.
Unfortunately, the shortages are not perestroika's only hazard. The
reasoning throughout this paper is essentiallythat the reform effort can be
improved by a judicious and well-timed application of additional, rather
strong medicine. The paper does not address the issue of whether
perestroika will actually be given the opportunity to inaugurate Phase III.
Consumer disillusionment over prices, supply, and quality is scarcely the
only potential hazard for Soviet reforms. The rebellious republics, the
possibility of significant and debilitating labor unrest, as well as other
sources of growing social unrest, all endanger perestroika's health and
longevity. This observer does not know what a "failure of perestroika"
might mean. He simply hopes that none of us will have to find out.
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